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Abstract The network neutrality debate originally stems from the growing
traffic asymmetry between ISPs, questioning the established peering or transit
agreements. That tendency is due to popular content providers connected to
the network through a single ISP, and whose traffic is not charged by distant
ISPs. We propose in this paper to review the economic transit agreements
between ISPs in order to determine their best strategy. We define a model
with two ISPs, each providing direct connectivity to a fixed proportion of the
content and competing in terms of price for end users, who select their ISP
based on the price per unit of available content. We analyze and compare
thanks to game-theoretic tools three different situations: the case of peering
between the ISPs, the case where ISPs do not share their traffic (exclusivity
arrangements), and the case where they fix a transfer price per unit of volume.
Our results suggest that a minimal regulation, consisting in letting ISPs choose
transit prices but imposing peering in case no agreement is reached, leads to
satisfying outcomes in terms of user welfare while still leaving some decision
space to ISPs, hence answering a concern they have regarding regulation in
the Internet market.
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1 Introduction
The Internet has moved from an academic network connecting universities to
a network used for everyday purposes and open to all. The network is now
made of competitive and profit-seeking content providers (CPs) and Internet
access providers (or Internet Service Providers (ISPs)). One important princi-
ple driving the current network is the universal access principle, meaning that
all consumers are entitled to reach meaningful content, whatever the technical
limitations of their service [12, 18, 31]. But because of large and bandwidth-
consuming CPs (for example YouTube), some ISPs have started to wonder
why distant CPs should not be charged by them, with the threat of their
traffic not being delivered if they do not accept to pay [19,30].
Our goal in this paper is to propose a model that will be solved by game-
theoretic tools to better understand the relations between the three sets of
players that are end users, ISPs and CPs, and to investigate from an economic
point of view the relevance of a threat to not transfer the traffic coming from
competitive ISPs (i.e., coming from CPs not directly connected to the con-
sidered ISP). Indeed, such threats have been used in the past (e.g., during
the Cogent/Level 3 dispute in 2005); we show in this paper that even if that
threat is not credible (the disconnection harms both sides), it strongly affects
the result of the negotiations. In this paper, we compare the three following
situations: (i) there is a peering agreement between ISPs who deliver the traffic
coming from the competitive ISP at no cost (ii) there is no agreement and no
traffic transfer from an ISP to another, limiting as a consequence the content
offer (and therefore, potentially end-user demand) at each ISP (iii) there is
a per-unit-of-volume transit price between the ISPs, which can be obtained
from a negotiated agreement between the ISPs–with or without a disconnec-
tion threat–or determined by a regulator wishing to maximize user welfare.
This model with the three different possibilities allows us to determine the
best peering relationships between ISPs and the relevance of the threat to
break the universality principle. Of course, our results have to be taken with
care, since our model is a considerable simplification of the actual Internet
ecosystem, whose increasing complexity since its creation is illustrated in [30].
There exists a recent flourishing literature dealing with network neutral-
ity modeling and analysis, see among others [1, 2, 8, 11, 19–23, 25, 29] and the
survey [15]. But those papers mainly discuss how revenue should be shared
among providers (ISPs and CPs) or how neutrality or non-neutrality affect
the providers’ investment incentives, innovation at the content level, network
quality, and user prices. The originality of our work relies on 1) the modeling
of peering or transit traffic pricing between the ISPs, 2) the modeling of the
amount of content directly connected to each ISP, and 3) the use of classical
discrete choice models to define how users choose their ISP depending on price,
reputation, loyalty, and available content.
With respect to the classification of approaches proposed in [15], our work
is closest to [7, 9, 17], that consider several ISPs in competition (instead of a
monopolistic one). However, those papers develop two-sided market models
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(with users having to attract users but also CPs), while we consider the CP
part as fixed and focus on the user side of the market. This enables us to de-
velop a further analysis of the price competition, with a more realistic model
than the Hotelling one used in [7,9] (where, e.g., users are forced to select one
ISP) or the perfect competition among ISPs assumed in [17] (leading to ISPs
making no revenues).
Note that our paper does not directly address the net neutrality problem
by comparing a neutral to a non-neutral stance; rather, we intend to under-
stand the (very closely) related issues of interconnection and peering/transit
agreements among ISPs. The interconnection issues among ISPs competing
to attract users are also studied in [6, 13, 16]. In [13] the decision variable as
regards interconnection is the quality of the link between ISPs; in this paper
we assume quality is sufficient, and the discussion is on the transit price to
apply. In [6] the authors consider bargaining among ISPs deciding to inter-
connect or not: this is also close to our model, but no explicit competition is
considered and the bargaining is on the sharing of extra revenue brought by
the interconnection, no unit transit price with underlying price competition
among ISPs is considered. Our work is also close to [16] where transit agree-
ments are studied, but where the competition is among telephone providers
applying usage-based pricing to users. This paper considers flat-rate pricing,
that is the most popular one for Internet access. We however obtain some
results comparable to [16], in particular the fact that it can be beneficial for
ISPs to set a non-null transit price.
Finally, it is worth mentioning [14], not because the model is very similar (the
authors consider a two-sided market with competition among ISPs but also
among CPs), but because the issues and some conclusions are comparable. The
authors study the risks of fragmentation of the Internet–where CPs having ex-
clusivity agreements with some ISPs are not reachable for all users–and analyze
the impact of net neutrality regulations (imposing null termination fees); their
conclusion is that the user-welfare optimal case is the no-fragmented one, and
that imposing null termination fees has ambiguous effect on user welfare while
preventing exclusivity deals is an easily applicable rule that improves the out-
come. Our conclusions, although in a slightly different context–interconnection
transit prices among ISPs–and with a different model, are in the same vein:
we advocate to let ISPs decide the transit price, the only regulation being to
maintain connectivity (the counterpart of the no-exclusivity rule).
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the basic assumptions of the model, the players, and the three scenarii we
propose to analyze and compare. The user welfare is also formalized, and
general formulas provided. Section 3 analyzes the game when there is peering
between ISPs (i.e., with a null transit price) and end users have a full access
to all CPs. Section 4 on the other hand describes the users repartition and
pricing game among ISPs when they do not agree to exchange their traffic.
Section 5 presents the analysis when there is a transit pricing agreement,
the price being determined from a bargaining phase between ISPs, or by a
regulator wishing to maximize user or social welfare. Section 6 concludes the
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paper by discussing the impact of the disconnection threat on the network
neutrality debate, arguing that a good compromise is a minimal regulation
consisting in enforcing connectivity among ISPs while letting them fix the
transit price.
2 Model
2.1 Model basic components and notations
We consider two ISPs called A and B, in competition for end users. Those
users are represented as a continuum of total mass assumed to be 1 without
loss of generality.
We also assume that we have content that users may be interested to reach.
We actually consider the traffic volume for that content, and also assume it
of mass 1 without loss of generality. We call yA (respectively, yB) the propor-
tion of downloaded content volume that is directly connected to the Internet
through A (respectively, B). In other words, content providers also have to
be connected to one of the two access providers A or B (or both), so that yA
represents the proportion of downloaded content attached to A. Note that the
proportions yA and yB encompass the popularity of the contents, which weighs
the computation of those proportions: yA (respectively, yB) represents the pro-
portion of the total aggregated flow originating from CPs, that originates from
a CP connected to ISP A (respectively, B). (We focus on downlink traffic only,
since uplink traffic to content providers is limited to requests and is negligible.)
Since we assume only two ISPs in this model, we have yA + yB ≥ 1; the case
when yA + yB > 1 corresponds to the situation where some CPs are multi-
homed, i.e., are attached to both ISPs. In that case the quantity yA + yB − 1
is the proportion of downloaded content coming from multihomed CPs. Note
that some CPs do not directly contract with ISPs but rather use Content
Delivery Networks (CDNs), that they operate themselves or that they pay
for their service. CDN services consist in storing the data closer to the user,
through cache memory servers located within (or close to) the ISPs to which
users are connected. That case is also covered by our model: if the CDN has
agreements with both ISPs–the most common case–then the corresponding
traffic volume would count as multihomed content (a user wanting to access
such content can get it with any ISP and no data transfer between ISPs is
needed), while if the CDN can only directly connect to ISP A or B then the
traffic volume is counted in yA or yB , respectively. In this paper we assume
that yA + yB < 2, i.e., not all content is multihomed.
The quantities yA and yB are assumed fixed in our model, since we focus on
the decisions that ISPs make in terms of traffic exchanges and end-user pricing.
So-called two-sided models [3, 28] would consider yA and yB as the result of
ISPs competing to attract content providers; we leave such approaches for
future work, for sake of simplicity and because such CP-ISP interactions can
be assumed to occur at a larger time scale than the one studied here.
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In terms of pricing, we denote by pA (respectively, pB) the access price for a
user to provider A (respectively, B). This access price is a flat-rate subscription
fee, independent of the amount of volume that the user will download. We also
assume that there might be a common price per unit of volume t for the traffic
transferred between the two ISPs, defining an economic relationship between
ISPs: if t = 0, this forms the classical peering agreement with no fee, while
t > 0 means a transit pricing (also called “paid peering” [30]) usually adopted
when there is a strong asymmetry. Note that we could consider a transit price
for each traffic direction; we choose symmetric prices here for simplicity, and
because in practice only one ISP pays the other, at the agreed unit price [30].
Those two situations–peering and paid transit–will be investigated in the next
sections, with also the situation when the link between ISPs is broken, so
that there is no possibility for users attached to an ISP to reach the content
attached to the other ISP. All those relations are summarized in Figure 1.
yA
yB
M
ul
tih
om
ed
ISP A ISP B No ISPt
End users
pA pB
User choices
Content
Fig. 1 Representation of relations between users, ISPs and CPs
2.2 User preferences
We assume that users select at most one ISP, their choice following a stan-
dard discrete choice model heavily used in travel behavior and econometrics
in general [4]. We more specifically use a logit model that can approximate
any random utility model. In a popular form of the logit model, the valuation
(level of satisfaction) of a user q for an alternative or choice i is random and
given by
Vq,i = vi + κq,i,
where vi is the average valuation and κq,i a random variable that represents
some unobserved random noise. The κq,i are assumed to be independent and
to have a Gumbel distribution of mean 0: P[κq,i ≤ z] = exp(− exp(−z − γ)),
where γ is Euler’s constant. In the rest of this paper, since the random variables
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κq,i (and, as a result, Vq,i) are identically distributed, we will drop the index
q.
The average valuation for an ISP i depends on the price pi, but also on
the amount of content available through that ISP, that we denote by xi. For
that latter measure we use the proportion of content that is likely to interest
users, hence we reason on download traffic volumes: xi is the proportion of
download traffic of content reachable from ISP i. It is important to remark
that the “mass” of available content xA for a user connected through ISP A can
differ from the proportion yA of download traffic from CPs directly connected
to ISP A. For instance, if ISPs exchange traffic then xA = xB = 1 (all the
content is reachable from all ISPs); while if there is no transit between ISPs,
xA = yA and xB = yB .
Finally, we assume that the average valuation vi depends on the price per
unit of available content , pi/xi, through the standard logarithmic relation
vi
def
= α log
(
xi
pi
)
, (1)
where α > 0 is a sensitivity parameter. This type of logarithmic functional
has also recently been justified in telecommunications using the context of the
Weber-Fechner Law, a key principle in psychophysics describing the general
relationship between the magnitude of a physical stimulus and its perceived
intensity within the human sensory system [27]. For our model, the logarithmic
function implies that the disutility perceived by a price raise is a function of
the relative price change, rather than the absolute change. The parameter α
then represents how sensitive users are to a given ratio among prices per unit
of content: for instance, when comparing providers A and B in the case when
they exchange traffic, the difference of perception due to price is α log(pB/pA).
This difference will then affect the user choices, modulo the random part κq,i
described above. Large values of α will diminish the impact of that random
part, so that users will mainly focus on prices, while on the other extreme low
values of α mean that prices have no impact on user choices, since those are
driven by the reputation and brand aspects contained in the variables κq,i.
Note that a null price yields an infinite valuation, so that a free option will
always be preferred to one with charge.
We additionally assume that there is an outside option labelled 0, with
average valuation v0, representing the (possibly negative) valuation for not
choosing any ISP, and that will be compared with the valuation for ISPs. In
accordance with (1), we also define p0
def
= exp(−v0/α), representing the cost
associated to not benefitting from any content. In our numerical illustrations,
unless specified otherwise, we will take p0 = 1 (or, equivalently, v0 = 0).
Each user chooses the option yielding the largest valuation. Following clas-
sical discrete choice analysis, a user will choose the option i ∈ {A,B, 0} with
probability
σ˜i(vA, vB , v0)
def
=
exp(vi)
exp(vA) + exp(vB) + exp(v0)
. (2)
ISP Inter-Relations 7
Consequently, for a given price profile (pA, pB , p0) and available contents (xA, xB),
that probability is
σi(pA, pB , p0)
def
=
(xi/pi)
α
(xA/pA)α + (xB/pB)α + 1/pα0
. (3)
Several remarks can be made here:
– The probability σi(pA, pB , p0) is also the proportion of users that will choose
option i ∈ {A,B, 0} given that users’ choice have been assumed indepen-
dent and that the total mass of users is 1.
– The ISPs that set their price to zero will attract all the users. However,
their revenue is null in this case.
– The distribution (σi(pA, pB , p0))i∈{A,B,0} uniformly concentrates on choices
whose price are minimal when α goes to ∞, and is uniform on {A,B, 0}
when it goes to zero.
– We could assume a different parameter α associated to each option αi for
i ∈ {A,B, 0}. As a consequence the choice probability would turn into
σi(pA, pB , p0)
def
=
(xi/pi)
αi
(xA/pA)αA + (xB/pB)αB + 1/p
α0
0
.
This heterogeneous case will be discussed for some cases when it is analyt-
ically tractable. However for reasons of clarity, those discussions are given
in appendices, and we focus in the paper on the homogeneous case.
2.3 ISPs’ utilities
ISPs’ utilities are modeled by the revenues they get, that come from the sub-
scription of end users and the transit fees between ISPs, if any. The subscrip-
tion revenues are proportional to the market share σi of each provider i and
its price pi. To express the transit fees, recall that for a customer of ISP A,
yA can be interpreted as the proportion of the download traffic that will go
directly through ISP A, while the remaining proportion 1− yA will have to be
delivered through B and then A (if possible), following Figure 1, to reach the
user. That fact, then, implies some money transfer (transit costs) from ISP A
to ISP B in case of transit agreements where the receiver that has asked for
the service has to pay for it (the so-called pull model).
The total amount of traffic transferred fromB toA is (1−yA)σA(pA, pB , p0),
paid by A to B, while it is (1 − yB)σB(pA, pB , p0) from A to B, paid by B.
Denote by ∆A,B the differential amount of traffic that is transferred from ISP
A to ISP B, i.e.
∆A,B = (1− yB)σB(pA, pB , p0)− (1− yA)σA(pA, pB , p0). (4)
Then the respective revenues UA and UB of provider A and B are
UA(pA, pB , p0) = σA(pA, pB , p0)pA + t∆A,B (5)
UB(pA, pB , p0) = σB(pA, pB , p0)pB − t∆A,B .
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2.4 User welfare
The user welfare, or user surplus, is defined as the aggregated net benefit that
users get from the system. We consider here as a reference outcome the one
with no service, for which the (random) user value is V0 = v0 + κ0. From the
logit model defined in the previous subsection, the net surplus of a user is
what he or she gains compared to that outside option, i.e., Z def= max(0, VA −
V0, VB−V0). Because the total user mass is 1, the user welfare, that we denote
by UW, is E[Z]. Now, remark that for z ≥ 0,
P[Z ≤ z] = P[(VA − V0 ≤ z) ∩ (VB − V0 ≤ z)]
= P[(V0 ≥ VA − z) ∩ (V0 ≥ VB − z)]
=
exp(v0)
exp(v0) + exp(−z)(exp(vA) + exp(vB)) .
The last equation is a direct consequence of (2), subtracting z to the average
valuations of options A and B.
Therefore, we have
UW = E[Z] =
∫ +∞
z=0
P[Z > z] dz
=
∫ +∞
z=0
exp(−z)(exp(vA) + exp(vB))
exp(v0) + exp(−z)(exp(vA) + exp(vB)) dz
= log (1 + exp(vA − v0) + exp(vB − v0)) (6)
= log
(
1 +
(
xA
p0
pA
)α
+
(
xB
p0
pB
)α)
.
As expected, the user welfare is always nonnegative, since users still have
the possibility to select no provider as in the reference situation: they only
choose to subscribe to a provider if it increases their utility.
2.5 Scenarios and game analysis
We recall that in the next sections, we will analyze the pricing game between
ISPs (and the transit pricing agreement) in three different scenarios:
1. In the first one, users can access all the content, independently of the
chosen ISP, because there is a peering agreement between ISPs (t = 0 and
xA = xB = 1 in our model).
2. In the second one, the link between ISPs is broken because they fail to agree
on traffic exchange. Therefore, users can only access the content associated
with the ISP they have chosen.
3. Finally, in the third scenario, the ISPs define a price per unit of volume
they charge each other for the traffic downloaded from the CPs associated
to their competitor and transmitted to their customers.
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We can notice a hierarchy in the game analysis: at the highest time scale
(only for the third scenario), the transit price is chosen (by a bargaining phase
or by a regulator). At the intermediate level, ISPs compete on prices to attract
customers and maximize their revenue in a classical non-cooperative game. Fi-
nally, at the smallest time scale, customers choose their ISP based on available
content and price. Remark that those levels are solved by backward induction,
anticipating the result at the time scale below.
3 Scenario 1: Peering between ISPs
In this scenario, ISPs have a peering agreement, and the users can access all
the available content. Consequently xA = xB = 1 and t = 0 in our model. For
given subscription fees pA and pB at providers A and B, the proportion of
users choosing option i ∈ {A,B, 0} is
σi(pA, pB , p0) =
(1/pi)
α
(1/pA)α + (1/pB)α + 1/pα0
. (7)
The revenue of i ∈ {A,B} can be expressed (with t = 0) as
Upeeri (pA, pB , p0) = σA(pA, pB , p0)pi
= pi
(1/pi)
α
(1/pA)α + (1/pB)α + 1/pα0
.
Knowing what will be the user repartition for a price profile (pA, pB)
(with p0 fixed), ISPs try non-cooperatively to maximize their revenue. The
equilibrium notion is that of Nash equilibrium, that would be a price pro-
file from which no ISP can increase its revenue by unilaterally changing its
price [26]. Formally, it is a price profile (ppeer,NEA , p
peer,NE
B ) such that ∀pA, pB ,
UpeerA (p
peer,NE
A , p
peer,NE
B , p0) ≥ UA(pA, ppeer,NEB , p0) and UpeerB (ppeer,NEA , ppeer,NEB , p0) ≥
UB(p
peer,NE
A , pB , p0).
From the definition, (0, 0) is a Nash equilibrium because a unilateral in-
crease in price from an ISP will drive all demand to the other ISP (recall that
a free option is always preferred from our discrete choice model, the associated
valuation being infinite), hence a revenue still at 0. Yet, the choice for an ISP
to deliver the service for free is a strictly dominated strategy unless the other
ISP is doing the same (in which case it is only weakly dominated, since all
strategies lead to a null revenue). Because non-zero price equilibria Pareto-
dominate the price profile (0, 0), in the rest of the paper we assume that ISPs
choose strictly positive prices when such a Nash equilibrium exists.
The following proposition establishes the existence and uniqueness of a
Nash equilibrium in the peering case.
Proposition 1 If 1 < α ≤ 2, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium different
from (therefore not considered) (0, 0), with equilibrium prices
ppeer,NEA = p
peer,NE
B =
(
2− α
α− 1
)1/α
p0
def
= ppeer,NE.
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The ISPs’ revenues are then
Upeer,NEA = U
peer,NE
B =
α− 1
α
ppeer,NE
= (2− α)1/α (α− 1)
1−1/α
α
p0.
The case when α ≤ 1 results in infinite prices, and α ≥ 2 leads to a price
war, i.e., providers decreasing their prices to 0, so that (0, 0) is the unique
equilibrium.
Proof We consider the derivatives of ISPs’ revenues with respect to their own
prices. For i ∈ {A,B}, we obtain
∂Upeeri
∂pi
= σi(1− α(1− σi)), (8)
with σi given in (7).
When α ≤ 1, the derivatives are always strictly positive, and prices tend
to infinity.
We now consider the case α > 1. Remark that σi is a strictly decreasing
function of pi on R+, going from 1 to 0, when the competitor sets a strictly
positive price. Therefore, from (8), for each value pj > 0 of its competitor’s
price, provider i has a unique best-reply price, that is strictly positive and such
that α(1− σi) = 1, i.e. σi = 1− 1α . Therefore, when α > 1 there can be only
one Nash equilibrium (ppeer,NEA , p
peer,NE
B ) with positive prices, that is such that
σA = σB = 1 − 1α . We immediately notice that such an equilibrium can only
exist if α ≤ 2, because otherwise we would have σA + σB > 1. In that case,
solving σA = σB = 1 − 1α based on (7) easily leads to the Nash equilibrium
prices provided in the proposition.
To analyze the case when α > 2, we explicitly express the best-reply price
function BRi(pj) of provider i when its competitor sets a strictly positive
price pj . That price is the value pi such that σi = 1− 1α , i.e., BRi(pj) = pi =(
(α− 1)(p−αj + p−α0 )
)−1/α. Remark that when α ≥ 2, since p0 > 0 we have
(α − 1)(p−αj + p−α0 ) > p−αj and therefore BRi(pj) < pj . In other terms, when
a provider sets a strictly positive price pj , the best reply of its competitor
is strictly below that price. That situation leads to a price decrease until
providers do not make any revenue. uunionsq
Notice that the result for α ≤ 1 corresponds to users with low price sensi-
tivity: when a provider i increases its price pi, the demand σi decreases slowly,
and the product piσi increases. In economic terms, this corresponds to a price
elasticity Ei of demand for provider i (when the other providers keeps its price
constant) being small in absolute value, i.e.
Ei
def
=
pi
σi
∂σi
∂pi
= −α(1− σi) ∈ (−1, 0).
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In our model, such small price elasticities incentivize ISPs to set infinite
prices (as seen previously). Since such an outcome is not realistic, we omit
that case an from now on assume that α > 1. The opposite situation of prices
decreasing to 0 when α ≥ 2, to attract customers of the competitor, is called
price war. It comes from a large price-sensitivity of users.
Let us now analyze the outcome that ISPs can achieve by cooperating, i.e.,
by setting prices so as to maximize the sum UpeerA + U
peer
B of their utilities.
Proposition 2 The sum of ISPs utilities is maximized by setting prices pA
and pB to
ppeermax =
(
2
α− 1
)1/α
p0, (9)
and is equal to Upeermax =
α− 1
α
ppeermax = 2
1/α (α− 1)1−1/α
α
p0.
Proof First note that if at least one price is zero, then the total revenue of
ISPs is null, hence such a price profile cannot be optimal. Thus, either the
optimal price of a provider is ∞, or it nullifies the derivative. Remark that
the derivative of UpeerA + U
peer
B with respect to pi with i ∈ {A,B} (and with
j 6= i) is
∂(UpeerA + U
peer
B )
∂pi
=
(p1−αi +αp
1−α
j −(α−1)pi(p−αj +p−α0 ))
p1+αi (p
−α
i +p
−α
j +p
−α
0 )
2
.
Recall that α > 1, and note that the derivative with respect to pi (i ∈
{A,B}) is strictly negative if pi is sufficiently large. The optimal pricing is
when the two above derivatives are null, i.e. when
p1−αA + αp
1−α
B − (α− 1)pA
(
p−αB + p
−α
0
)
= 0
p1−αB + αp
1−α
A − (α− 1)pB
(
p−αA + p
−α
0
)
= 0.
The difference between those equations leads to (pA − pB)(p−αA + p−αB + p−α0 ) = 0
which implies pA = pB . Then their common value ppeermax is obtained from any
of those equations, yielding the unique solution given in (9). uunionsq
We now compute the cost of competition for ISPs, through the ratio of
their total revenues without cooperation (i.e., at the Nash equilibrium) and
with collaboration. That ratio equals
Upeer,NEA + U
peer,NE
B
Upeermax
= 2
(
1− α
2
)1/α
.
Notice that it does not depend on p0. We remark that the larger the user
sensitivity to prices, the more ISPs lose by not cooperating.
For 1 < α < 2, it can be readily checked that a larger sensitivity to price
(i.e., a larger α) yields a larger user welfare and smaller ISPs revenues, and
also that a price competition among ISPs is better for users, this improvement
increasing with α because the price sensitivity exacerbates competition as
highlighted before.
12 Pierre Coucheney et al.
4 Scenario 2: No traffic exchanged between ISPs
Because of the potential traffic asymmetry between ISPs, the peering agree-
ment of previous section may not seem satisfactory for one ISP. Two alterna-
tives are considered in this paper: to break the connection between ISPs so
that subscribers of a provider have access to the content of that provider only,
or to set a transit price such that an ISP has to pay for the content hosted by
the competitor and accessed by its own customers (this last scheme is the topic
of the next section). We aim in this section to study what happens if there is
no traffic exchanged between ISPs, and if we can identify a loser and/or a win-
ner. Breaking the transit possibility is not necessarily beneficial for a provider
since users have access to less content and may then prefer not to subscribe
to any provider. It is interesting to note that breaking the connection between
ISPs has been implemented in the past; this was for instance the case in 2005
during a dispute between the ISPs Cogent and Level 3, with as a consequence
undelivered emails and unreachable web sites for some customers [10].
In our model, we make the simplifying assumption that the CP-ISP agree-
ments will remain unchanged, while it is likely that some CPs may want to
switch ISPs or to be multihomed. Such dynamics are not considered here.
From our model, if the communication link between ISPs is cut, then xA =
yA and xB = yB , and from (3), the ISP revenues are
U cutA (pA, pB , p0) = pA
(yA/pA)
α
(yA/pA)α + (yB/pB)α + 1/pα0
U cutB (pA, pB , p0) = pB
(yB/pB)
α
(yA/pA)α + (yB/pB)α + 1/pα0
.
The next proposition characterizes the outcome of the competition between
ISPs in this case. Here too, (pA, pB) = (0, 0) is a Nash equilibrium but the free
strategy is a strictly dominated strategy unless the other ISP is doing the same
so that we will again ignore this strategy when a Nash equilibrium different
from (0, 0) exists.
Proposition 3 If 1 < α ≤ 2 and 0 < yi < 1, i = 1, 2, there exists a
unique Nash equilibrium different from (0, 0), with equilibrium prices pcut,NEA =
yAp
cut,NE and pcut,NEB = yBp
cut,NE, where
pcut,NE = ppeer,NE =
(
2− α
α− 1
)1/α
p0.
The ISPs’ revenues are then U cut,NEA = yAU
cut,NE and U cut,NEB = yBU
cut,NE,
where
U cut,NE =
α− 1
α
pcut,NE = (2− α)1/α (α− 1)
1−1/α
α
p0.
The case α ≥ 2 leads to a price war with (0, 0) as the unique equilibrium.
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Proof The proof mimics the one of Proposition 1, since we again have for each
provider i
∂U cuti
∂pi
(pA, pB , p0) = σi(1− α(1− σi))
with σi =
(yi/pi)
α
(yA/pA)α+(yB/pB)α+1/pα0
. uunionsq
At a Nash equilibrium, ISPs’ price (resp., revenue) is equal to the price
(resp., revenue) they set (resp., get) in the peering scenario of Section 3, mul-
tiplied by the proportion of content they control. As an important conclusion,
no ISP i has an interest in breaking the connection, whatever the content yi
it controls, because its revenue will be reduced (or the same if yi = 1).
Surprisingly, if one ISP controls the whole set of contents (for example
if yA = 1, i.e., all CPs are attached to ISP A), then it gets exactly the same
revenue as in the first scenario, whatever the content hosted by the competitor.
In the previous section we have studied the case where ISPs were cooper-
ating (and peering) in order to maximize the sum of their revenues. Though
we have not looked at how they split the total revenue among themselves. A
question we would like to answer now is: is there a situation such that both
ISPs have an interest in cooperating for a given repartition of the total revenue
with respect to a price competition and no traffic exchange? If the answer is
positive, what is the interval such that the bargaining is satisfying?
Let us consider a revenue sharing agreement among ISPs, when cooper-
ating and peering, such that provider A gets a proportion piA of the total
revenue Upeermax , and provider B obtains the rest. ISP A would then prefer
that agreement over a pure competitive situation with no traffic exchange, if
piAU
peer
max ≥ U cut,NEA = yAU cut,NE. From Propositions 2 and 3, we obtain that
this holds if and only if piA ≥ yA(1− α/2)1/α. Similarly, such an agreement is
acceptable for ISP B if and only if piB = 1−piA ≥ yB(1−α/2)1/α, so that the
agreement is stable when
yA(1− α/2)1/α ≤ piA ≤ 1− yB(1− α/2)1/α.
In particular, we remark that the width of the stable area increases with α ∈
(1, 2). For example, when α tends to 2, any revenue sharing of cooperatively
obtained revenue is acceptable by ISPs, because competition with such price-
sensitive users would lead to a price war and null revenues. On the other
opposite, when α tends to 1 then the acceptable sharing set is reduced to
piA ∈ [yA/2, 1 − yB/2]. Figure 2 displays that acceptable region for piA in
terms of α ∈ (1, 2), with yA = 0.8 and yB = 0.5.
Finally, Figure 3 shows the utilities of ISPs and user welfare as a function
of the parameter α. The shape of the curves is the same as in Scenario 1, even
if the utilities of ISPs are about two times smaller.
5 Scenario 3: transit pricing
We now address the case where the traffic transferred from an ISP to the other
is compensated for by some payment. We first determine if a Nash equilibrium
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Fig. 2 In gray, the set of proportions of Upeermax that ISP A can receive so that both ISPs
accept to cooperate with respect to a broken connection threat. Here yA = 0.8 and yB = 0.5.
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Fig. 3 User welfare (left) and sum of ISP’s utilities (right) at Nash equilibrium, with no
exchanged traffic, with x = 0.8.
exists in that context when such a transit unit price t > 0 is determined, and
we characterize it. Then, we discuss how the transit price can be determined on
top of the pricing game for customers, by a regulator or through a bargaining
phase between ISPs. Remark that, here again, the transit price is chosen first,
but by backward induction, anticipating the equilibrium of the (pricing) game
played afterwards.
We begin by studying the game given by the revenue functions (5), with
a fixed transit price t > 0, the case t = 0 corresponding to our Scenario 1.
A first difference with the previous scenarios is that the pricing (0, 0) is no
longer a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, when an ISP sets its price to zero, it gets
no revenue from the users, but only from the transferred traffic charged to the
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other ISP, while it has to pay for its client accessing the content attached to
the competitor ISP. Then two cases appear:
– If the amount of traffic transferred between each ISP is exactly the same,
i.e., ∆A,B = 0 (see (4)), then both ISPs earn zero revenue. But since at
least one ISP has some content associated to it - say, w.l.o.g., ISP A, i.e.,
yA > 0 -, that one could get a strictly positive revenue by setting any
strictly positive price pA > 0: the market shares would be θA = 0 and
θB = 1, leading to a revenue UA = tyA > 0.
– If ∆A,B 6= 0, then one ISP (ISP A if ∆A,B < 0, ISP B otherwise) gets
a strictly negative revenue, whereas it can ensure a nonnegative one by
setting a strictly positive price and having no subscribers, hence only col-
lecting revenue from transit traffic payments.
In order to determine the Nash equilibrium of the game, we first analyze
the best-response functions of each ISP. The derivative of ISP i’s revenue is
(with i, j ∈ {A,B}, j 6= i):
∂Ui
∂pi
=
K(pj)p
α
i + Li(pj)p
α−1
i + 1
p2αi
(
p−αi + p
−α
j + p
−α
0
)2 , (10)
whereK(z) def= (1−α)(z−α+p−α0 ) and Li(z) = αt
(
(2− yA − yB)z−α + (1− yi)p−α0
)
.
Notice that Li ≥ 0. Furthermore, K(z) < 0 since α > 1.
We do not reach an analytical expression of the best-response prices of each
ISP. Nevertheless, several useful properties are listed in the next proposition,
whose proof is given in Appendix C. For convenience, we denote by BRtA(pB)
and BRtB(pA) the best-response correspondences for, respectively, ISP A and
B with transit price t.
Lemma 1 For every yA, yB ∈ [0, 1]2, the best-response price correspondence
of each ISP i to the competitor (ISP j 6= i) pricing strategy satisfies the fol-
lowing properties:
(i) it is single-valued,
(ii) it is continuous,
(iii) it is uniformly bounded with strictly positive bounds. Furthermore, each
ISP can ensure a strictly positive net revenue (that includes user sub-
scriptions and transit prices).
(iv) it increases with the transit price t, i.e. ∀pj , t, r,
t > r ⇔ BRti(pj) > BRri (pj),
(v) BRti(pj) is strictly increasing (resp., strictly decreasing, constant) in the
competitor’s price if (α(2−yA−yB)t/p0)
α
(α−1)α−1
(
1−yj
2−yA−yB
)
is lower than (resp.,
greater than, equal to) one.
Those properties can be used to prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium
for the pricing game played among ISPs, in the situation of paid transit.
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Fig. 4 ISP’s best response functions, with yA = 0.8, α = 1.5, t = 1, for yB = 0.2 (no CP
multihoming, left) and yB = 0.5 (30% of multihomed content, right).
Proposition 4 Consider the game where the ISPs compete on their prices
pA and pB to maximize their revenue given in (5). Then there exists a Nash
equilibrium (ptrans,NEA , p
trans,NE
B ) with p
trans,NE
A > 0 and p
trans,NE
B > 0, resulting
in strictly positive revenues.
Proof From Lemma 1, the best-response function of each ISP i is continuous,
and bounded by strictly positive values. Let us denote by mi (resp., Mi) the
lower (resp., upper) bound of BRti. Then consider the application
g : [mA,MA]× [mB ,MB ] 7→ [mA,MA]× [mB ,MB ]
(pA, pB)→ (BRtA(pB),BRtB(pA)).
Since g is continuous and [mA,MA] × [mB ,MB ] is a compact convex subset
of R2, from Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, it has a fixed point that consti-
tutes a Nash equilibrium with strictly positive prices (ptrans,NEA , p
trans,NE
B ) ∈
[mA,MA] × [mB ,MB ]. The strict positivity of the revenues comes from the
fact that, from item (iii) of Lemma 1, each ISP can always ensure a strictly
positive revenue, whatever the other ISP price. uunionsq
Note that, unlike in the previous scenarios, there is no price war when
α ≥ 2 as soon as t > 0, meaning that both providers benefit from the transit
pricing because they then reach a strictly positive revenue. In the following,
we show that it is at the expense of the user welfare.
Figure 4 shows a numerical approximation of best-response functions. Their
form suggests that the Nash equilibrium is unique; however, we did not manage
to provide theoretical evidence of that result, and can only conjecture the Nash
equilibrium is unique.
We know that, for every price transit t, there exists a Nash equilibrium. We
are now interested in the way the transit price is determined anticipating the
fact that ISP will select some Nash equilibrium prices afterwards. The next
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proposition states that a regulator seeking to optimize the user welfare should
impose a null transit pricing.
Proposition 5 The unit transit price maximizing user welfare is t = 0, which
corresponds to the peering situation between ISPs (Scenario 1).
The proof is given in Appendix D.
A regulator seeking to maximize user welfare will set the transit price to
zero. But if the aim is to maximize the ISPs (sum of) utilities, it is no longer
the case, as illustrated on Figure 5, where the value of t that maximizes the
total ISPs’ utility is about 0.8. Figure 6 illustrates the evolution of ISPs’ utility
at the Nash equilibrium when the transit price t varies. For small values of
t, the utilities of both ISPs increase. One can notice that the utility of the
ISP that owns the least content starts to decrease first. We also see that the
point that maximizes the sum of utilities is very close to the maximal possible
revenue for ISPs if they cooperate, which corresponds to Upeermax given in the
peering scenario.
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ti
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sum ISPs
User welfare
Fig. 5 Utilities of the stakeholders at Nash equilibrium prices, as a function of t, with
yA = 0.8, yB = 0.2, α = 1.5.
We now compare several policies for choosing the transit price.
– A first policy consists in maximizing the user welfare. From the previous
proposition, that amounts to setting t = 0.
– A second policy consists in maximizing the sum of ISP utilities (for instance
it could be applied by a regulator).
– And finally, we compare those two policies with the one obtained by a
non-cooperative bargaining process between the ISPs two possibilities are
considered.
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Fig. 6 ISP utilities at Nash equilibrium prices, when the transit price t varies. The threat
point (i.e., the utilities corresponding to the Nash equilibrium when ISPs are disconnected),
the point optimizing the sum of utilities as well as the maximal revenue by cooperating on
prices (dashed line) are drawn. Parameter values: α = 1.5, yA = 0.8, yB = 0.2.
Let us detail the bargaining process. Here we use the bargaining, or negotia-
tion game proposed in [24]: each ISP independently chooses a set of acceptable
transit prices t (prices that ensure a chosen amount of revenue), and if the in-
tersection of those sets is non-empty, the transit price is arbitrarily taken in
the intersection, otherwise the threat is executed. This negotiation scheme has
several equilibria, but in [24] the most likely to be played is the one maximiz-
ing the product of the utilities minus the utility at the threat. In other words,
that equilibrium transit price maximizes
max(0, U trans,NEA (t)− U threatA ) ·max(0, U trans,NEB (t)− U threatB ),
where U threati represents the utility that ISP i obtains if the negotiation fails
(two cases will be considered in the following). Remark that this solution is
the classical axiomatic Nash bargaining solution [26].
Our numerical results suggest that the peering threat favors the small ISP
against the big one, when compared to the disconnection threat. More specifi-
cally, Figure 7 compares the utility of each ISP obtained with the bargaining
procedure when the threat corresponds to the disconnection (i.e., U threati =
U cut,NEi ), to the utility achieved when the threat (because of the legislation)
is that ISPs are forced to maintain a connection (i.e., U threati = U
peer,NE
i ).
We observe that the ISP with the most content (the big ISP) monotonically
(in terms of proportion of contents) benefits from the disconnection threat,
while the opposite is true for the other ISP (the small ISP). In the case with
enforced peering threat, the small ISP still loses some revenue when its weight
decreases, but the revenue of the big ISP is no longer monotonic. We observe
that the enforced peering threat is a better rule than the disconnection threat
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for the small ISP, while it is the opposite for the big ISP. An interpretation
comes from the comparison of both threat situations from the ISPs’ point of
view: as seen in Sections 3 and 4, and also illustrated in Figure 6, both ISPs
have the same revenue in the peering case, while the big ISP has a larger
revenue than the small one in the disconnection case. As a result, in the case
of a disconnection threat (with respect to the peering threat) the small ISP
has less bargaining power than the big one, since it has more to lose if no
agreement is reached. This benefits the big ISP in the negotiation. With the
peering threat the effect is the opposite: the small ISP would get the same
revenues as the big one if no agreement is found, while with positive transit
prices it obtains less than the big one as can be seen on Figure 6.
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Fig. 7 Comparison of each ISP’s utility after bargaining process with disconnection and
enforced peering threats, when yA and α vary, with yB = 1− yA (no content multihoming).
It also appears that the enforced peering threat (with respect to the discon-
nection threat) favors users against ISPs. The intuition behind this observa-
tion stems from our previous reasoning: enforced peering gives more bargaining
power to the small ISP, who will therefore obtain a smaller transit price during
the negotiation, hence leading to a situation closer to the peering scenario (that
maximizes user welfare). In Figure 8, we show how the utilities of ISPs and of
the users are impacted by the chosen policy, when the user sensitivity α and
the proportion yA of download traffic of content attached to ISP A vary, in the
case when no content is multihomed (yB = 1− yA). We first remark that the
bargaining with disconnection threat leads to ISP revenues and user welfare
very similar to the policy maximizing the sum of ISPs’ utilities (the curves of
total ISP revenues superimpose). This means that the non-cooperative (bar-
gaining) choice for t with the disconnection threat leads to a nearly optimal
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Fig. 8 ISPs’ utilities and user welfare for different policies for choosing t, when α and yA
vary, with yB = 1− yA (no content multihoming).
point (that takes into account the competition between ISP afterwards) for
ISPs. Nevertheless, as one can see, when yA is close to 1 or α close to 2 the
user welfare is not exactly the same in both cases (see Figure 8 (a) and (c)),
hence this is not a general property. One can also observe in Figure 8 (c)
and (d) that the utilities are not very sensitive to the repartition of content
among ISPs (the parameter yA), except for the bargaining with enforced peer-
ing threat. In particular, the solution maximizing user welfare does not depend
on yA, hence utilities are constant in that case. Finally, the bargaining solution
obtained with the enforced peering threat is almost optimal for users (resp.,
ISPs) when their sensitivity α is low (resp., high). The difference of content
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owned by each ISP also decreases the utility of ISPs in this case, while the
achieved utility is optimal when contents are equally hosted by the ISPs.
Arbitrating between user welfare and ISP revenues is generally done using
the aggregate social welfare, that estimates the overall value of the system.
However, our user welfare represents the aggregate perceived utility of users,
that is not expressed in monetary units because of our choice of a logarithmic
perception of prices, motivated by psychophysics studies and recent experi-
ences in the context of telecommunications. On the other hand, the ISP wel-
fare is in monetary units, so summing them directly would be artificial. One
may define a conversion constant and define social welfare a weighted sum of
ISP revenues and user welfare, however choosing non-arbitrarily that constant
is beyond the scope of this paper, and since it has a strong influence on the
resulting social welfare we cannot draw conclusions on social welfare here.
6 Conclusions
The results of our paper suggest that the scenario where no transit is per-
formed by ISPs should never be chosen, since no stakeholder benefits from it.
In accordance with previous works on interconnection of competing networks,
we also observed that under price competition, paid transit can be preferred
to peering by both ISPs. This especially holds when users are highly sensitive
to price: paid transit is then the only agreement under which ISPs can ensure
strictly positive revenues, avoiding a price war, for any strictly positive value
of the transit unit price. Paid transit therefore appears as the best solution to
ensure ISP rentability in a highly competitive context like the current Internet
ecosystem, where customers are very volatile and frequently switch providers.
Moreover, the transit price can also be used by a regulatory entity to drive
the ISP price to a desirable direction, be it in terms of global ISP revenues
(the optimal revenue when ISP collaborate can be approached without collab-
oration through a proper choice of the transit price) or of user welfare (that
can be favored if a sufficiently low transit price is imposed).
Finally, if the transit price is fixed among ISPs through a negotiation, our
study suggests that a limited regulation consisting in imposing transit agree-
ments (i.e., imposing that transit be performed to ensure a global connectivity,
but at a price chosen by the ISPs) benefits to users, who eventually perceive
lower prices, and a higher welfare. Such a regulation indeed reduces the bar-
gaining power of the ISPs controlling the most content, and hence favors the
emergence and survivability of new ISPs with less content. Without this reg-
ulation, our numerical results suggest that bargaining (with a disconnection
threat) leads to an outcome very close to the one where ISPs cooperate to
maximize their total revenue.
Coming back to the Network Neutrality debate, and the request from ISPs
to be rewarded for transit, we find that our results corroborate their claim and
concerns, since null transit prices may lead to ISPs making no revenue despite
their infrastructure investments. The results in this paper therefore support
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the transit price scenario, that is also likely to be chosen by ISPs if the choice is
theirs, so that the need for regulation is not obvious. However, this paper also
suggests that a limited regulation (enforcing global connectivity) does prevent
incumbent ISPs from having a dominant position in the bargaining, and favors
competition and users. Given the results presented here, we would advocate
that such a minimal regulation be imposed, and that other choices be left to
the stakeholders (here, the ISPs), remaining consistent with the freedom spirit
that prevailed at the beginnings of the Internet. From a practical point of view,
such a policy also has the advantage of being extremely simple to implement,
since connectivity among ISPs is very easy to verify. The regulator would just
need to declare disconnection illegal, and to advertise that rule in order to
affect the negotiations among ISPs.
As a direction for future work, we would like to investigate the case where
the transit ISPs are paid for transferring the external content to their cus-
tomers (the push model), instead of being charged in this paper (the pull
model). This would correspond to another interpretation of the service offered
by ISP, where ISPs would sell to content providers the access to their networks,
while in this paper they sell to their users the access to all content. That new
interpretation may also raise the necessity of considering a two-sided market,
where ISPs compete to attract end-users but also to attract content providers.
Also, our current research efforts aim at understanding the influence of
other types of actors in the content distribution chain, namely Content Deliv-
ery Networks (CDNs), on the setting described in this paper. CDNs dramati-
cally affect the volumes of data exchanges and may re-balance the forces; here
also, a careful economic analysis of the strategical behaviors of all actors is
necessary.
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A The peering scenario with heterogeneous sensitivity parameters
A.1 Equilibrium prices
In the heterogeneous case with different αs, proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 1 and
using the fact that ∂U
peer
i
∂pi
= σi(1− αi(1− σi)), it can be shown that, at equilibrium:
– If there is one i ∈ {A,B} such that αi ≤ 1, then ppeer,NEi = ∞, because the utility is
increasing, independently of the parameters αj for j 6= i. The opponent j 6= i chooses
ppeer,NEj =∞ for the same reason if αj ≤ 1, and ppeer,NEj such that σj = 1− 1/αj , i.e.,
ppeer,NEj = ((αj − 1)p−α00 )(−1/αj) otherwise.
– If αA, αB > 1,
– If (1/αA) + (1/αB) ≥ 1, there is a unique solution to the system of equations with
null derivatives, giving
ppeer,NEA =
(
αBαA − αB − αA
αB(1− αA)
)1/αA
p
α0/αA
0
ppeer,NEB =
(
αAαB − αA − αB
αA(1− αB)
)1/αB
p
α0/αB
0 .
– If (1/αA) + (1/αB) ≤ 1, then we again have a price war with, at equilibrium,
ppeer,NEA = p
peer,NE
B = 0.
The equilibrium cases in terms of (α1, α2) are summarized in Figure 9.
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A.2 The cost of competition to ISPs
In the heterogeneous case, the derivatives of the sum of providers utilities UpeerA + U
peer
B
are
∂(U
peer
A
+U
peer
B
)
∂pA
=
p
1−αA
A
+(1−αA)pA(p−αBB +p
−α0
0 )+αAp
1−αB
B
p
1+αA
A
(p
−αA
A
+p
−αB
B
+p
−α0
0 )
2
∂(U
peer
A
+U
peer
B
)
∂pB
=
p
1−αB
B
+(1−αB)pB(p−αAA +p
−α0
0 )+αBp
1−αA
A
p
1+αB
B
(p
−αA
A
+p
−αB
B
+p
−α0
0 )
2
.
Here again, if there is a i ∈ {A,B} such that αi ≤ 1, the derivative with respect to pi
is always positive, and setting pi = ∞ is the optimal strategy. Then the total revenue is
infinite whatever the value of pj for j 6= i. Now, if αA, αB > 1, the system
p
1−αA
A + αAp
1−αB
B − (αA − 1)pA
(
p
−αB
B + p
−α0
0
)
= 0
p
1−αB
B + αBp
1−αA
A − (αB − 1)pB
(
p
−αA
A + p
−α0
0
)
= 0
leads to pB =
αB(αA − 1)
αA(αB − 1)
pA. Indeed, αB times the first equation minus αA times the
second one gives (αB(αA − 1)pA − αA(αB − 1)pB) (p−αAA + p−αBB + p−α00 ) = 0. However,
we did not reach an analytical expression for the optimal value of pA, that can be computed
numerically.
A.3 User Welfare in the heterogeneous case
We also immediately get from (6)
UW(pA, pB , p0) = log
(
1 + pα00
((
xA
pA
)αA
+
(
xB
pB
)αB))
.
B The disconnection scenario with heterogeneous αs
In the heterogeneous case with different αs, the results can again be obtain similarly to
the homogeneous case, using that ∂U
cut
i
∂pi
= σi(1− αi(1− σi)). It can be shown that, at
equilibrium:
– If there is one i ∈ {A,B} such that αi ≤ 1, then again pcut,NEi = ∞. The opponent
j 6= i chooses pcut,NEj = ∞ for the same reason if αj ≤ 1, and ppeer,NEj = yj((αj −
1)p−α00 )
(−1/αj) otherwise.
– If αA, αB > 1,
– If (1/αA) + (1/αB) ≥ 1, there is a unique solution to the system of equations with
null derivatives, giving
pcut,NEA = yA
(
αBαA − αB − αA
αB(1− αA)
)1/αA
p
α0/αA
0
pcut,NEB = yB
(
αAαB − αA − αB
αA(1− αB)
)1/αB
p
α0/αB
0 .
– If (1/αA) + (1/αB) ≤ 1, then we again have a price war with, at equilibrium,
pcut,NEA = p
cut,NE
B = 0.
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C Proof of Lemma 1
Proof We provide here the proof for ISP A only, as it is symmetric for ISP B. Recall that, by
definition,K(v) def= (1−α)(v−α+p−α0 ), and LA(v)
def
= αt
(
(2− yA − yB)v−α + (1− yA)p−α0
)
,
so that K < 0 if α > 1, and LA ≥ 0.
(i) The derivative (10) of the revenue function of ISP A is strictly positive for pA small
enough, and strictly negative for pA large enough. It follows that a best response must
satisfy ∂UA
∂pA
= 0. We did not reach any closed form solution to this equation, thus we are
naturally led to studying the sign of the derivative of UA. Notice that the sign and zeros of
this derivative are the same as those of the function
S(u, v)
def
= K(v)uα + LA(v)u
α−1 + 1, (11)
with u = pA and v = pB . Since α > 1, K(v) < 0. Looking at the derivative ∂S∂u shows that
S is increasing if u ≤ 1− α
α
LA(v)
K(v)
, and strictly decreasing otherwise. Now, remark that for
every v, S(0, v) > 0 and lim
u→∞S(u, v) = −∞. Since S is continuous, it follows that the equa-
tion S(·, v) = 0 has a unique solution, so that the best-response function is single valued.
Let us denote by u¯(v) the unique solution to S(·, v) = 0, which is also the best-reponse to
pB = v. One can remark that S(u, v) is positive if and only if u ≤ u¯(v). This gives us a
criterion to compare a value u with the root u¯(v), that we will frequently use in the rest of
the proof.
(ii) The continuity is a consequence of Berge’s maximum theorem [5]. The hypotheses of the
proposition are valid here, so that the best-response price correspondence is upper hemicon-
tinuous. Since that correspondence is single-valued, it is a continuous function.
(iii) From the previous analysis, we have for all v
u¯(v) >
1− α
α
LA(v)
K(v)
=
t(2− yA − yB)(v−α + (1− yA)p−α0 )
v−α + p−α0
≥ t(1− yA), (12)
hence a uniform lower bound for u¯(v) that is strictly positive as soon as yA < 1. In the
case yA = 1, our bound goes to zero when v → ∞. However, we can directly see from (11)
that we have lim
v→∞ u¯(v) =
p0
(α− 1)1/α , which is strictly positive. By the continuity of the
best-response, there exists v0 > 0 such that
v ≥ v0 ⇒ u¯(v) ≥ p0
2(α− 1)1/α
def
= C1.
On the other hand, from (12) we have
v ≤ v0 ⇒ u¯(v) ≥ t
1 + p−α0 v
α
0
def
= C2,
and therefore, u¯(·) is also uniformly bounded on R+ by min(C1, C2), that is a strictly positive
constant when x = 1.
For the uniform upper bound, we claim that
u¯(v) ≤ u0 def= max
(
1,
(2− yA − yB)αt
α− 1 ,
pα0 + αt(1− yA)
α− 1
)
.
To check that, it suffices to show that S(u0, v) < 0 for all v > 0. We first have
u0 ≥ max
(
(2− yA − yB)αt
α− 1 ,
pα0 + αt(1− yA)
α− 1
)
≥ 1 + αt((2− yA − yB)v
−α + (1− yA)p−α0 )
(α− 1)(v−α + p−α0 )
=
1 + LA(v)
−K(v) ,
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where the second inequality comes from the fact that we take a weighted sum (with positive
weights) of the two terms above. Since u0 ≥ 1, it follows uα−10 (−K(v)u0 −LA(v)) ≥ 1, and
S(u0, v) = K(v)uα0 + LA(v)u
α−1
0 + 1 ≤ 0.
We claim that playing a best-response always yields a strictly positive revenue for the ISP.
Indeed, it can ensure a revenue larger than zero by setting its price to infinity: that way it
gets no customers (hence no subscription revenues), and therefore does not pay any transit
fee. However, that cannot be a best-response, since it should be bounded. Hence the best-
response is strictly better, which results in a strictly positive revenue.
(iv) Let t and r be two transit prices, with t > r. Assume that the price v of ISP B is fixed,
and let u¯r denote the best-response of ISP A to v under transit pricing r. Then
(1− α)(v−α + p−α0 )u¯αr + αr((2− yA − yB)v−α + (1− yA)p−α0 )u¯α−1r + 1 = 0. (13)
To show that the best-response under transit pricing t is greater than u¯r, it suffices to
establish that
(1− α)(v−α + p−α0 )u¯αr + αt((2− yA − yB)v−α + (1− yA)p−α0 )u¯α−1r + 1 > 0. (14)
because, from the proof of (i), S(u, v) > 0 only if u < u¯(v), and thus S(u¯r, v) > 0 means
u¯r < u¯t = u¯(v). But (14) comes directly from (13) and t > r.
(v) Let v > w. We seek to compare u¯(v) and u¯(w). By definition, we have S(u¯(w), w) =
0. Then, S(u¯(w), v) = (v−α − w−α)u¯(w)α−1 ((1− α)u¯(w) + αt(2− yA − yB)). Therefore,
u¯(v) > u¯(w) if and only if (1 − α)u¯(w) + αt(2 − yA − yB) < 0, i.e., u¯(w) > αt(2−yA−yB)α−1 .
The last inequality is equivalent to S(αt(2−yA−yB)
α−1 , w) > 0, which is equivalent to
(α(2− yA − yB)t/p0)α
(α− 1)α−1
(
1− 1− yA
2− yA − yB
)
> 1.
That last inequality does not depend on w, which implies that u¯(v) is monotonic. uunionsq
D Proof of Proposition 5
Proof We prove here that the user welfare (6) at the Nash equilibrium, different from (0, 0),
with t = 0 is greater than the user welfare at every Nash equilibrium with t > 0. Recall that
the user welfare is
UW = log
(
1 +
(
p0
pA
)α
+
(
p0
pB
)α)
.
The result follows from the fact that, for each ISP, the price at the Nash equilibrium is the
lowest when t = 0, which we establish below, without loss of generality, for ISP A.
Recall that BRtA(pB) (resp., BR
t
B(pA)) is the best-response of ISP A (resp., B) with
transit price t. We also denote by (ptrans,NEA (t), p
trans,NE
B (t)) the Nash equilibrium with the
smallest price for A. Then, for all z < ptrans,NEA (t) and every t > 0 we have
z < BRtA(BR
t
B(z)). (15)
Indeed, the best-response being lower bounded by a strictly positive value, (15) is verified
when z → 0. If there exists z < ptrans,NEA (t) that does not satisfy the inequality, then by
continuity of the best-response functions, there is necessarily pˆ < ptrans,NEA (t) for which pˆ =
BRtA(BR
t
B(pˆ)). But this means that (pˆ,BR
t
B(pˆ)) is a Nash equilibrium, which contradicts
the hypothesis of ptrans,NEA (t) being the smallest price of ISP A at an equilibrium.
Now, recall from Lemma 1 that the best-response is a strictly increasing function of t.
Furthermore, while tα
((2− yA − yB)α/p0)α
(α− 1)α−1
(
1− yj
2− yA − yB
)
< 1, the best-response BRti(·)
is a strictly increasing function of the other ISP’s price. Let t be small enough so that
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BRtA(pB) is strictly increasing. Let 0 < r < t, and assume that p
trans,NE
A (t) < p
trans,NE
A (r).
Then we have:
ptrans,NEA (t) < BR
r
A(BR
r
B(p
trans,NE
A (t)))
< BRrA(BR
t
B(p
trans,NE
A (t)))
< BRtA(BR
t
B(p
trans,NE
A (t))) = p
trans,NE
A (t).
The first inequality comes from (15) together with the hypothesis ptrans,NEA (t) < p
trans,NE
A (r).
The second one is due to the fact that BR·B increases with the transit price, and that BR
r
A
increases with the price set by B. The last one is due to the increasingness of BR·A in the
transit price, and the last equality stems from ptrans,NEA (t) being a Nash equilibrium price
for ISP A. Finally, this shows a contradiction. Hence ptrans,NEA (t) increases with t as long as
tα
((2− yA − yB)α/p0)α
(α− 1)α−1
(
1− yj
2− yA − yB
)
< 1.
It remains to show that ptrans,NEA (t) is larger than p
trans,NE
A (0) for large values of t. We
have shown that ptrans,NEA (t) increases with t while the transit price is below tˆ that satisfies
tα
((2− yA − yB)α/p0)α
(α− 1)α−1
(
1− yj
2− yA − yB
)
= 1. For that value of t, BRtˆA is constant, and
BRtˆA = p
trans,NE
A (tˆ) ≥ ptrans,NEA (0). For t > tˆ, the best-response function is larger than
BRtˆA according to item (iv) of Lemma 1, and then larger than p
trans,NE
A (tˆ), independently
of pB . Hence the Nash equilibrium price of ISP A is larger than p
trans,NE
A (tˆ) and, finally,
than ptrans,NEA (0). uunionsq
